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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
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of the estate of J{atie C. Johnson, 
sometimes known as Kate Johnson, 
deceased, also known as Katie John-
son, 
vs. 
S. R. ROSS and EDITH ROSS, his 
Wife, S. R. ROSS INCORPORAT-
ED, a corporation, SIDNEY M. 
HOR~fAN and JANE DOE HOR-
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
).IARY PARKER, Administratrix of \ 
of the estate of Katie C. Johnson, 
sometimes known as Kate Johnson, 




S. R. ROSS and EDITH ROSS, his 
Wife, S. R. ROSS INCORPORAT-
ED, a corporation, SIDNEY M. 
HORMAN and JANE DOE HOR-





Brief of Respondents 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Except as amplified in their argument, Respondents 
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ARGUMENT 
Appellant claims the Decree in question was void 
for two reusons,. namely: 
1. That the Defendant, Katie C. Johnson, was dead 
prior to the commencement of the action. 
2. That due diligence was not used in an attempt to 
locate the Defendants in the action. 
The Appellant alleges in Paragraph 3 of her Second 
Amended Complaint that the action was against Katie C. 
Johnson, et al, Defendants. The Affidavit for publica-
tion of Summons shows that in addition to Katie C. 
Johnson ''unknown Defendants'' were also included in 
the action. Record 20. 
Section 104-57-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, per-
mits "unknown Defendants" to be sued as such. Section 
104-57-11 provdes in substance that service of Summons 
may be made upon all ''unknown Defendants' by publi-
cation in the manner provided for the publication of 
Sumr.aons in other civil actions, and concludes with the 
following: 
''and any such unkno\vn person who has or claims 
to have any right, titre, estate, lien or interest in 
the said property, which is a cloud on the title 
thereto, adverse to the plaintiff, at the time of the 
commencement of the action, who has been duly 
served as aforesaid, and a.nytone claiming under 
him)' shall be concluded by the judgment in such 
action as effectually as if the action were bronght 
against such person by his or her name, notwitlt-
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standing such unknown person may be under legal 
disability." (Italics ours.) 
The plaintiff in the present action is suing in her 
representative capacity as Administratrix of the estate 
of Katie C. Johnson, deceased. She represents the heirs 
and creditors of Katie C. Johnson, deceased, who are in-
cluded as ''unknown Defendants'' in the previous action 
in question and are bound by the Decree made and enter-
ed therein. 
So far as we are aware, Sections 104-57-10 and 104-
57-11 have not been construed by this Court. However 
the problem involved was considered in the case of Law-
rence, vs. :Murphy, 147 Pac. 903, 45 Utah 572. In the Law-
rence vs. Murphy case, John W. West and Sarah A. West, 
and ''unknowns'' were named as Defendants in the 
action, but the Wests were dead before the suit was 
commenced. Although the Court held that the attempted 
publication of Summons was void under the Statute in 
existence at that time, which statute was repealed in 
1927, the implication is, that had the requirements of the 
statute been met, the Decree would have been binding 
upon the heirs of John W. West and Sarah A. West, as 
unknown defendants. The Respondents therefore con-
tend that the Plaintiff in this action is bound by the 
Decree in the action in question, although Katie C. John·· 
son died prior to the commencement thereof. 
Now, let us turn our attention to the question of 
"due diligence." The Affidavit for Publication of Sum-
mons was made pursuant to Section 104-5-12, Utah Code 
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Annoted 1943 on the ground that the Defendants could 
' ' 
not "after due diligence be found within the State." The 
Affidavit for Publication of Summons shows the follow-
ing: (Record 20, 21, 22) 
1. Summons was placed in the hands of the Sheriff 
of Salt Lake County, and the Sheriff after due search 
and diligent inquiry shows in his return that he was 
unable to find the Defendant. 
2. The records of the Salt Lake County Recorder 
were searched and the address of Katie C. Johnson was 
shown in a Deed on record to be Butte, Montana. 
3. The tax rolls in the Salt Lake County Treasurer's 
office were searched and two street addresses for Katie 
C. Johnson in Butte, Montana, were found. 
4. Letters were addressed to Katie C. Johnson to 
the two street addresses in Butte, Montana, and also 
general delivery, Butte, Montana, but no answer was re-
ceived from such letters. 
5. A search was made of the judgment records in 
the Salt Lake County Clerk's office, the probate records 
in the Salt Lake County Clerk's office, the records in 
the Salt Lake County Assessor's office, the records in the 
City Treasurer's office of Salt Lake City, Salt Lake City 
Directory and Telephone Directory for many years, but 
no information was obtained from any of the above 
sources as to the whereabout of Ka6c C. Johnson. 
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It was further alleged in the Affidavit that each of 
said Defendants is a necessary and proper party Defend-
ant to said action. And that the said Defendants can 
not, after due diligence, be found within the State of 
Utah. 
Appellant maintains a "useless search of records in 
Salt Lake County, Utah" was made and contends that 
when the address of the Defendant, Katie C. Johnson in 
Butte, "Jiontana, was ascertained that the search should 
have continued in the State of Montana, and that by 
failing to make a further search in the State of Montana 
that ''due diligence'' was not used. 
It seems absurd for Appellant to contend that after 
an address for Defendant was ascertained in Butte, 
Montana, that further search in Utah was useless. The 
publication of Summons is based upon the ground that 
''after due diligence the Defendant can not be found 
within the State.'' That an old address for Defendant 
out of the State of Utah was ascertained does not pre-
clude the necessity of making a further search in the 
State of Utah for the reason that the Defendant may 
have come into the State of Utah subsequent to having 
resided at the address which was ascertained outside of 
the State of Utah. 
Were the Court to up-hold Appellant's construc-
tion of the statute there would never be an end to the 
sean·h required. In the instant case, the Appellant 
cla1ms to have made inquiry in the State of Montana 
and found that the Defendant, Katie C. Johnson, was 
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deceased. But suppose upon inquiry Appellant learned 
that Defendant had moved to some other State or 
country. Then according to Appellant's theory, a search 
wonld have to be made in such other State or Country, 
and so on ad infinitum. Under such a construction the 
statute would lose aU practical value, and title to prop-
erties would forever be in jeopardy. By no possible con-
struction of Section 104-5-12 can it be held that the Legis-
lature intended that the search should go beyond the 
State of Utah. For as stated in the statute, a ground of 
publication of Summons exists when the Defendant can 
not "after due diligence be found within the State", 
meaning the State of Utah. 
Appellant cites no case to support her contention. 
Some reference is made to the case of Liebhart vs. Law-
rence, 40 Utah, 24:1 120 Pac. 215. In that ease the Affi-
davit was merely in the language of the statute and no 
facts constituting due diligence were alleged. The assess-
ment rol1s showed the property had heen assessed in the 
name of the Defendant for certain years, and disclosed 
the Defendant's address in Denver, Colorado. No copy 
of the Summon or Complaint was ever mailed to the 
Defendant at that address. In addition there was an ele-
ment of fraud in the case, in that the Plaintiff in the 
original action prevented the Defendant therein from 
having his day in Court until the time within which he 
might appear and object had expired. Under 1hese 
circumstances, none of which exist in the C'ase now hefore 
the Court, the publication of Summons was held to be 
void. It was held in the Liebhart case that the acts con-
stituting dne diligence must be alleged in the Affidavit, 
() 
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and further that the Clerk, or Judge who makes the 
order for publication of Summons, acts judicially. The 
objection to the Affidavit which existed in the Liebhart 
case, that is that no facts constituting due diligence were 
alleged, does not exist in the instant case, for here facts 
were alleged upon which a proper judicial determina-
tion could be and was made that due diligence had been 
used. 
\Ve ha,·e found no case where the Affidavit was held 
defective which contained facts showing as exhaustive a 
search as was made in the case now before the court. 
However, there are a number of cases in which the Affi-
davit \vas upheld where the facts relied upon for due 
diligence were not nearly as exhaustive as in the instant 
case. . A leading case on this question is Rue vs. Quinn, 
66 Pac. 216 (Cal.) The substance of the Affidavit was as 
stated in the opinion on Page 216, as follows: 
"The affidavit for an order directing the 
publication of summons was made by the attorney 
for the plaintiff, and in it, after stating that the 
surrrrnons had been placed in the hands of the 
sheriff of San Diego county for service, he stated 
that said sheriff had returned the same with his 
return indorsed thereon to the effect that he could 
not find the respondent herein in said county of 
San Diego; that affiant did not know the resi-
dence of said defendant; that since said summons 
was issued he had made due and diligent search 
and inquiry for the said defendants, and each of 
them, for the purpose of serving a summons upon 
them by inquiring for each of them of several 
prominent county officers (giving the names of 
such officers) ; and further stated: ''I have also 
madP inquiry of all other persons from whom I 
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could expect to obtain information as to the resi-
dence or whereabouts of each of the said defend-
ants, and after such search and inquiry and due 
diligence the said deefndant, Louisa Munro cannot 
be found within the state of California.'' 
The Court held that the Affidavit (which was made by 
the attorney for the Plaintiff) was good. The entire case 
should be read as it answers many of the objections of 
Appellant. The following language of the court on page 
217 is especially pertinent to the questions involved: 
''When service is to be made in this mode 
upon the ground that the defendant cannot, after 
due diligence, be found, within the state, the affi-
davit must show two facts, viz. the exercise of due 
diligence to find the defendant within the state, 
and a failure to find him after the exercise of such 
diligence. If either of these facts does not appear 
by affidavit, the court or judge has no jurisdic-
tion to make the order, and an order made thereon 
will be insufficient to sustain a judgment based 
upon such serviee. In making the· order for the 
service by publication, the judge acts judicially 
upon the evidence which the Code requires to be 
presented to him for that purpose, and can act 
upon no other evidence than such as is prescribed 
by the Code. If the facts set forth in the affidavit 
have a legal tendency to show the exercise of dili-
gence on the behalf of the plaintiff in seeking to 
find the defendant within the state, and that, after 
the exercise of such diligence, l1e cannot be found, 
the derision of the judge that the affidavit shows 
the sr,me to his satisfaction is to be regarded with 
the same effect as is his decision upon any other 
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''There is not an entire absence of evidence 
in the affidavit on behalf of the plaintiff to sus-
tain the order, and it cannot be regarded as void. 
The facts set forth therein afford some evidence 
of diligence on the part of the plaintiff to find the 
defendant, and also that, notwithstanding such 
diligence, she could not be found within the state; 
and, although the facts are based upon informa-
tion of others, it cannot be said that the affidavit 
is of no legal effect to- authorize the court to be 
satisfied therefrom, or that it did not have a 
tendency to establish both the fact of diligence 
and of failure to find the defendant. 
"The objections that the facts stated in the 
affidavit are only hearsay, and that the inquiries 
of the affiant were limited to persons in the county 
of San Diego, were proper to be considered by the 
judge when an application for the order was made, 
for the purpose of determining whether sufficient 
diligence had been employed to ascertain if the de-
fenda;nt could be found within the state; but these 
facts do not justify a disregard of his conclusion, 
or render his order void. From the nature of the 
question to be determined, the evidence thereon 
must, to a. very great extent be hearsay, and the 
number and character of the persons inquired of 
must in each case be determined by the judg·e. 
Diligence is in all cases a relative term and what 
is due diligence must be determined by the circum-
stances of each case. If it should be held as an 
invariable rule that inquiries should be extended 
beyond the county in which the suit is pending, it 
might be difficult to say which counties of the state 
could be safely omitted, and unless the judge is at 
liberty to determine whether the person from 
1chom inquiries have been made sufficiently show 
the requisite diligence, it might be necessary for 
thr plaintiff to question all the citizens of the 
f'ounty befo·re obtaining the order." (Italics ours.) 
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An affidavit which the court conceded to be not as 
strong as in Rue vs. Quinn, was held valid in the case of 
People vs. Wrin, 76 Pac. 646 (Cal.) See also the following: 
Chapman vs. Moore, 91 Pac. 324 (Cal.) 
Merchant National Union vs. Buisseret, 115 Pac. 
59 (Cal.) , 
Clarkin vs. Morris, 172 Pac. 981 (Cal.) 
Bell vs. McDermoth, 246 Pac. 805 (Cal.) 
People v. Fay, 255 Pac. 239 (Cal.) 
Cases from other jurisdictions could be cited, but 
the California cases, which contrue statutes substantially 
like ours, are ample authority to meet the objections rais-
ed by the Appellant. Appellant has quoted from the case 
of Liebhart vs. Lawrence on page 7 of her Brief, as 
follows: 
"The spirit and intent of the statute is to 
give the non resident notice of the proceenings 
against or affecting his property, if that ran be 
done.'' 
Surely the spirit and intent of the statute, as expres-
sed above, has been followed in this case. An exhaustive 
search for the Defendant in the State of Utah was made, 
as disclosed by the Affidavit before the Court. The Ap-
pellant alleged in paragraph 4 of her Second Amended 
Complaint that Alice Larson, also known as Mrs. R. E. 
Larson, is the sole heir of Katie C .. Johnson, and that 
said Alice Larson resided in Butte, ::\fontana, at thf~ time 
10 
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this action was filed. The Affidavit recites that Mr. 
Lund caused a letter to be sent to Katie C. Johnson in 
care of ~Ir. R. E. Larson, who is a son-in-law of Katie C. 
JPhnson. Appellant alleges in Paragraph 7 of hell" 
Second Amended Complaint that mail was caused to be 
forwarded to Katie C. Johnson in care of the said R. E. 
Larson, 70~ A \Vest Park, Butte, ~fontana. Respondents 
demurred to the allegations of said paragraph on the 
ground of uncertainty, which Demurrer was sustained. 
Although the entire file of the action in question is not 
before this Court, it is a reasonable assumption that the 
"mail" referred to by Appellants in Paragraph 7, con-
sisted of a Summons and Complaint in said action for-
warded to Katie C. Johnson by the Clerk of the Court 
pursuant to Section 104-5-13. Thus two written notices 
of the existence of the claim of the Plaintiffs in the action 
to the property formerly owned by Katie C. Johnson 
went to the home of Alice Larson, the sole heir at law of 
Katie C. Johnson. The heir of Katie C. Johnson can not 
complain about not having had an opportunity to be heard 
in the proceedings effecting the property in question. 
Therefore in this case the requirements of the statute 
with respect to publication of Summons have been met, 
and furthermore, actual notice of the proceedings was 
given to the heir of Katie C. Johnson. Under these cir-
cumstances the judgment of the trial Court should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROMNEY AND BOYER, 
Attorneys for Respondents. 
N. R. ROSS and S. R. ROSS, Inc. 
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